
Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Swapped Crypto Wallet Addresses on Ledger, CNN and 186 Sites
Attackers used malicious scripts delivered through Optimizely to replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses on about 186 websites, including Ledger, according to researchers. Report URI says the attacker's wallets received roughly $7,150, while StepSecurity puts the associated holdings near $6,600; neither figure is confirmed as total stolen funds.
Written by CoinArticle’s AI Newsroom · from 3 cited sources. How we work
Story Updates
- Updated Nov 17, 2026, 11:08 AM: Report URI details clipboard swapping, card skimming, iOS exploit kits and a $7,150 wallet total; Optimizely confirms the fix.
What Happened
Malicious JavaScript delivered through Optimizely, a website testing and experimentation platform, was used to swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses on websites including hardware wallet maker Ledger, exchange Coinpass, trading platforms IG and OANDA, and large companies such as Salesforce, Zoom, CNN and the BBC. Optimizely said in a status update on Monday evening that an unauthorized party had exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious code to some customer projects.
The count of affected sites varies by source. Security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI found the malicious code in 188 of 1,611 Optimizely scripts he examined, belonging to 178 organizations. Other outlets reported 186 infected websites. The two figures likely reflect different counting methods, such as scripts versus domains.
Because the code was served from Optimizely's own trusted servers, affected websites loaded it without their own systems being breached. Optimizely said it has fixed the flaw, removed the injected code, secured affected user accounts and added protections against unauthorized code delivery. Spokesperson Victoria Johnson told Gizmodo that the company had blocked access to the vulnerable signup flow.
How the Malware Worked
According to StepSecurity, which named the campaign OPTIMJACK, the script scanned pages for cryptocurrency addresses and replaced them with attacker-controlled ones. It validated that an address matched its blockchain and checked for nearby payment terms such as "wallet," "deposit" or "send" before swapping. The script covered Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tron, Solana, Litecoin, Toncoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin.
Report URI said the script also swapped addresses copied to a user's clipboard, so anyone who copied an address while an affected page was open could have pasted the attacker's address instead. The script also skimmed card details typed into some sites' own payment forms, though not those entered into hosted fields such as Stripe's. On iPhones and iPads it attempted to load exploit kits known as Coruna and DarkSword, which target older versions of iOS. Report URI said it could not determine how many card numbers were stolen or how many devices were compromised.
Scale of Funds Involved
Report URI said the attacker's wallets received about $7,150 in crypto, mostly in Bitcoin, Litecoin and USDT, and that the attacker emptied the wallets early on Tuesday. StepSecurity separately traced about $6,600 in value to four attacker-linked addresses at November 16 prices, with one Bitcoin address receiving 0.0853 BTC, about $5,575, across five transactions.
The two figures come from different methodologies and neither has been confirmed as a total of stolen funds. StepSecurity noted that some Ethereum and Tron activity predates the attack, so its figure cannot be attributed in full to the campaign. Report URI also linked one Tron cash-out address to earlier operations in March and on November 3.
Timeline and Infrastructure
The injected code first appeared early on November 16 UTC. StepSecurity found the loading domain 1688360.cc had been registered that morning and was hosted on Google Cloud, and the JavaScript changed at least four times within two hours as attackers updated the payload. Report URI reported the code had been removed from all scripts it could find by late that evening. The timing of remediation across every affected site is not detailed in the sources.
Why It Matters
The incident shows that third-party experimentation and web scripts can expose crypto custody and payment flows at scale, a risk likely to draw closer scrutiny of vendor security across the sector.
This article is for information only and is not financial advice. Read the full disclaimer.




