
ZachXBT Alleges Lazarus Group Is Largest User of Kruw's Bitcoin CoinJoin Service
Blockchain investigator ZachXBT accused Kruw, a Bitcoin CoinJoin coordinator, of knowingly serving North Korea-linked Lazarus Group as its largest user. Arkham Intelligence traced about 2,173.76 BTC, valued near $154.45 million, from a September 2025 Bitget hack into CoinJoin transactions.
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The Allegation
Blockchain investigator ZachXBT accused North Korea-linked Lazarus Group of being the largest user of Kruw's Bitcoin CoinJoin coordinator, and alleged that Kruw's operator knew it. He made the claim in a post on X on November 17 in response to a Kruw post citing a share of Bitcoin blockspace. ZachXBT's reply did not include a ranking of customers or a coordinator-specific breakdown of the funds.
The dispute began with blockspace figures. Kruw's operator said on November 17 that users of the coordinator accounted for 1.6% of Bitcoin's total blockspace, quoting an August 5 post that put the figure at 1.1%. Neither post disclosed the measurement period or the calculation behind the percentages. One source described the 1.6% figure as self-reported and disputed by ZachXBT.
What Arkham Traced
Arkham Intelligence, in a November 16 analysis, counted 2,173.76 BTC, valued at $154.45 million, entering CoinJoin transactions from wallets it linked to the September 2025 Bitget hack. Of that, 2,065.43 BTC went directly into WabiSabi CoinJoin rounds and 108.33 BTC passed through new addresses first. Arkham's figures describe Bitcoin entering CoinJoin generally. Its quoted post does not assign the entire amount to Kruw's coordinator, and the WabiSabi protocol used in those rounds is not specific to one operator.
Across the 11-day period Arkham reviewed, 2,266.68 BTC worth $161.04 million left the labeled wallets. The CoinJoin total equals roughly 95.9% of those outflows by Arkham's calculation. Daily movements included 351.96 BTC on November 14 and 316.35 BTC on November 15, with 77.07 BTC recorded for November 16 at the reporting cutoff. Only 34.63 BTC, worth $2.25 million, remained in the labeled wallets. Arkham said fresh addresses could still belong to the attacker, that some transfers mixed labeled and unlabeled inputs, and that transfers through over-the-counter desks or laundering services were also possible.
Prior Government Alert
A June 2025 US Secret Service alert specifically identified Kruw.io as a service used by Lazarus. According to the alert, the group had previously mixed approximately $14.3 million in stolen cryptocurrency through it and was using it to launder some proceeds of the $1.5 billion Bybit theft. The agency described Kruw.io as the most prolific of the services that emerged to offer CoinJoin via the Wasabi protocol after zkSNACKs stopped its own coordination service. One report put the scale of the alert's laundering proceeds at around $1 billion across various exploits, a figure that differs from the $14.3 million cited for Kruw.io specifically.
Context and Open Questions
CoinJoin lets several Bitcoin users combine inputs and outputs in one transaction, which makes tracing any one participant's funds harder. Operators can argue they run neutral infrastructure for anyone seeking privacy. ZachXBT's allegation centers on knowledge: whether Kruw knew its largest customer was a state-linked hacking group. None of the claims have been tested in court. They are allegations from an independent investigator whose earlier work has contributed to freezes and other enforcement actions.
Kruw has not publicly responded in detail to the allegations in the material reviewed. Whether law enforcement builds on the 2025 alert, and whether further on-chain analysis connects additional stolen coins to the service, remain open. For exchanges and stablecoin issuers, funds that pass through CoinJoin still have to exit at some point, and those exit points may be where investigators make the most progress.
Why It Matters
For Traders
Exchange and stablecoin compliance teams may tighten screening of Bitcoin flows tied to CoinJoin, which can affect the liquidity and withdrawal paths of exposed addresses.
For Investors
Sustained scrutiny of privacy coordinators could raise regulatory and legal risk for Bitcoin privacy infrastructure over the coming year.
For Builders
Teams running coordinators or privacy tooling should review how they log, screen and respond to flagged inputs before enforcement questions reach them.
This article is for information only and is not financial advice. Read the full disclaimer.





